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Abstract From the mid-1950s to the early 1980s the Treasury and Bank of England 
successfully advocated a policy of restricting both private and public sector house-building, as 
a key but covert instrument of their wider ‘stop-go’ macroeconomic policy framework. While 
the intensity of restrictions varied over the economic cycle, private house-building was 
restricted (through limiting mortgage availability) for almost all this period. This was achieved 
by keeping building society interest rates low relative to other interest rates and thus starving 
the building society movement of mortgage funds. Mortgage restriction was never publicly 
discussed and sometimes operated alongside ambitious housing targets and well-publicised 
policy initiatives to boost housing demand. This paper outlines the evolution of house-building 
restriction, together with its impacts on the housing sector and the wider economy. We review 
the evolution of the policy framework and its consequences, compare the level and stability of 
British house-building during this period - historically and relative to other countries, and 
undertake time-series econometric analysis of its impacts on both house-building and house 
prices. Finally, implications for debates regarding stop-go policy, Britain’s housing problem, 
and the distributional consequences of government macroeconomic policy are discussed.  
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From the early 1950s to the early 1980s the Treasury and Bank of England successfully 
advocated policies of ‘stop-go’ aggregate demand management, initially to facilitate the 
restoration of sterling as a ‘strong’ international currency and re-establish the City as a major 
financial and trading centre, despite the constraints of large war debts and low currency 
reserves. The stop-go literature generally focuses on the impacts of restrictions on 
manufacturing industry, particularly consumer durables, through hire purchase controls, 
variations in Purchase Tax, and controls on providing loan and equity capital to firms in these 
sectors.i However, there was another major strand of stop-go policy to which the Treasury and 
Bank of England accorded similar importance - the restriction of house-building and house 
mortgage lending.  
Stop-go restrictions on public sector house-building (by reducing the loan sanction for 
the necessary borrowing and raising the interest rates facing local authorities), are 
acknowledged in some specialist housing studies.ii However, following the abolition of direct 
controls on house-building, it is generally assumed that government did not systematically 
intervene to control private sector house-building. A few studies have noted that low building 
society interest rates, relative to general interest rates, was a significant factor behind the 
shortage of mortgage funds (and, in turn, new private house-building) but did not identify this 
as conscious aim of policy.iii The only exception (to our knowledge) is a study by the civil 
service economist Alan Holmans, whose discussion of mortgage rationing makes brief 
reference to, ‘pressures exerted by successive governments to keep increases in mortgage rates 
to an unavoidable minimum,’ in order to reduce house purchases and, therefore, aggregate 
demand.iv 
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This study shows that restricting house-building was viewed by the Treasury and Bank 
of England as a key instrument of stop-go policy, reducing both consumer expenditure and 
capital investment (as other forms of construction, such as roads and schools, were closely 
linked to the volume of new house-building). This policy instrument was not publicly discussed 
and sometimes operated alongside ambitious housing targets and well-publicised initiatives to 
boost housing demand. Its implementation for most of the period between the mid-1950s and 
early 1980s had a number of major cumulative impacts on the British economy, including 
depressing the long-term rate of capital formation in housing; creating inflationary expectations 
for house purchasers; impacting negatively on living standards (especially for lower-income 
families); and damaging the growth, and productivity, of the house-building sector and the 
building society movement.  
We first provide a brief overview of how the Treasury used the building societies’ cartel 
to ensure that mortgage lending was kept below levels anticipated in the absence of 
intervention. The following sections discuss the evolution of mortgage rationing from the mid-
1950s to 1979, together with contemporary qualitative evidence of its impacts. We then provide 
quantitative comparisons of housing development in Britain over this period, both historically 
and relative to other West-European countries. This is followed by an econometric analysis of 
the impacts of stop-go on levels of private sector house-building and house prices. The paper 
concludes by examining the implications of our findings for debates regarding stop-go policy, 
Britain’s housing problem, and the distributional consequences of government macroeconomic 
policy. 
I 
Building societies dominated Britain’s house mortgage market. Even in 1973 (when 
building society lending was restricted, while other lenders, particularly the banks, 
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substantially expanded their housing loans), building societies had gross advances of £3,540 
million, compared to £319 million by the banks; £293 million by local authorities; and £259 
million by insurance companies. Moreover, most other lenders did not compete with the 
building societies’ basic mortgage business, instead focusing on bridging loans, ‘loans to staff’, 
topping-up loans, or (in the case of local authorities) loans to customers who were not 
considered good building society risks.v 
In July 1951 the Building Societies Association [hereafter BSA] Council adopted a 
policy of recommended interest rates on mortgages and savings.vi These were not binding, 
though members undertook to give the BSA 28 days’ notice of intention to depart from its 
recommendations.vii The Treasury used the recommended rates system – effectively a building 
society cartel - to control mortgage lending by ensuring that building society savings rates were 
sufficiently low that they were obliged to ration mortgages in order to maintain liquidity. This 
raised opposition within the movement, partly because of its negative impacts on competition 
and growth.viii However, BSA officials pointed to the threat of statutory restriction of lending 
rates if the current voluntary system was abandoned. Meanwhile the Treasury and Bank of 
England blocked various attempts to prohibit the BSA cartel on competition policy grounds 
(including the National Board of Prices and Incomes in 1967, the 1973 extension of the 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act to services, and a 1978 initiative by the Chief Registrar of 
Friendly Societies), as it provided a practical means to control building society mortgage 
lending in line with macroeconomic objectives.ix 
Building societies regarded stability in their rates structure as an important objective in 
its own right, as they viewed mortgages as long-term contracts involving an implicit obligation 
to submit lenders to minimal rate disturbance.x Raising market interest rates was often thus 
sufficient to intensify mortgage rationing, given the ‘stickiness’ of building society rates. 
However, this was not always the case – especially when the movement perceived its reserves 
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to be under pressure. The Treasury then used a combination of informal pressure and, less 
frequently, formal requests, to set mortgage rates, and rationing, at its desired level.xi The 
Treasury particularly valued this instrument of stop-go policy owing to its effectiveness and 
‘invisibility’. As a 1973 Bank of England memorandum noted, BSA ‘reactions to official 
monetary policy were sufficiently indirect for them not to be seen by the ordinary observer as 
the desired effect of Government [interest rate] policy.’ A later annotation replaced ‘desired 
effect’ with ‘principal objective’.xii 
This policy was invisible to public scrutiny. A 1957 Treasury memorandum noted that 
there had been no announcement of the termination of the government’s 300,000 new houses 
per year target on which it was first elected.xiii Some twenty years later the National Economic 
Development Office report, Housing for All, omitted any mention of government private 
housing restriction in its extensive historical review of housing policy, despite significant 
discussion of credit availability, interest rates, and building society lending policy as 
constraints on owner-occupation.xiv 
II 
Britain emerged from the Second World War with a housing stock that had seen no significant 
additions for six years and had lost some 475,000 homes due to bombing (plus a much greater 
number temporarily damaged).xv During the immediate post-war period severe physical 
shortages and competition from higher-priority construction projects limited the scope for new 
house-building. However, these had eased somewhat by the end of Labour’s time in office and 
while 913,604 permanent dwellings had been completed in Britain from the end of the War to 
June 1951, there were 214,099 under construction.xvi  
Britain also emerged from the War with considerable debts and low currency reserves. 
An influential coalition of Bank of England and Treasury officials (including Cameron 
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Cobbold, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England from 1945-49 and Governor from 1949-
61) advocated an economic policy based around restoring sterling’s credibility – through 
savage deflation. John Maynard Keynes criticised this group for prioritising international 
‘obligations’ over the war-time commitment to build a fairer society – repeating the 1920s gold 
standard episode – though his direct influence was ended with his untimely death in April 
1946.xvii However during the immediate post-war period the ‘sterling first’ policy was seen as 
flying in the face of political realities by both the Labour and Conservative parties; as was 
dramatically confirmed by Labour’s landslide 1945 election victory. 
 By the early 1950s the potential for an economic strategy based around domestic 
reconstruction had increased, owing to the economic recovery of Europe, which made 
Keynes’s proposal for an external policy based on bilateral trade and payments arrangements, 
together with the blocking, or funding, of overseas sterling balances, more practicable. Indeed 
policies aimed at insulating the domestic economy, by tightening import controls on dollar 
goods and stimulating trade between non-dollar countries, were still under serious discussion 
in early 1952.xviii Such measures would have provided much greater scope for domestic 
reconstruction and enabled Britain to reduce the effective burden of its overseas debt through 
economic growth. However, this would come at the cost of long delays in re-establishing 
sterling convertibility and the City’s status as an international financial centre. 
The Conservatives’ October 1951 election victory saw a shift towards policies aimed 
at hastening sterling convertibility and an early resumption of the City’s role as an international 
financial centre, which required greater openness to capital inflows and outflows that would 
increase Britain’s vulnerability to sterling crises (which, in turn, acted as a brake on the pace 
of liberalisation).xix Thus, despite only having balance of payments deficits in two of the 
following ten years, policy-makers found it necessary to institute periodic ‘squeezes’ in 
aggregate demand to main confidence in sterling, mainly through reducing capital investment 
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and household consumption.xx The Bank of England and Treasury were sufficiently confident 
of their ability to cope with any pressure on sterling by domestic deflation that controls on the 
transferability of external sterling holdings were substantially liberalised in March 1954, 
paving the way for de facto current account convertibility from February 1955.xxi The early 
abolition of import controls further increased sterling’s vulnerability, by deteriorating the 
balance of trade.xxii 
The Conservatives had pledged to increase national house-building to 300,000 homes 
per year.xxiii The Treasury strongly opposed the 300,000 housing target, though Harold 
Macmillan - a more powerful and effective Minister of Housing and Local Government than 
his successors – successfully frustrated Treasury efforts to abandon this key election 
pledge.xxiv  The 300,000 target was achieved in 1953 and building peaked in 1954 at 340,000 
completions. However in October 1954 Macmillan was replaced by Duncan Sandys – the 
first of a string of less powerful housing ministers. Despite Sandys’ best efforts, he was 
unable to prevent the Treasury targeting housing as a key instrument of stop-go during the 
1955-57 credit squeeze, which heralded what proved to be the start of a more or less 
continuous period of restriction (to varying degrees), until the early 1980s. Holmans 
identifies late 1967, late 1971 to early 1972, and possibly late 1977 as the only intervals when 
mortgage rationing was insignificant.xxv Meanwhile local authority house-building was 
controlled by restricting loan sanction for the necessary funds, and raising the interest rates 
facing local authorities (the Public Works Loan Board rate at which they borrowed was 
increased from 3.75 per cent in 1954 to 5.0 per cent by the end of 1955, while from October 
1955 local authorities were encouraged to borrow in the market where practicable, which 
incurred higher interest rates).xxvi  
The Treasury saw new house building (both private and public sector), as a key 
instrument of stop-go policy; indeed Otto Clarke later recalled that the Treasury regretted the 
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abolition of building licenses and would have reimposed them in 1956 and 1957 if this had not 
required new legislation.xxvii Their rationale is illustrated by a dispute with the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government [hereafter MHLG] in July 1955 – when the credit squeeze was 
being further tightened. Clarke had called the Chancellor’s attention to a ‘misleading statement’ 
in the Cabinet minutes that the output of council houses should not fall below 200,000 (contrary 
to what he claimed was an agreement with MHLG that British 1955 council housing 
authorisations should not exceed 180,000). The Treasury’s intent was to reduce total housing 
output to far below 300,000 by 1957, through restricting annual council housing building to 
130,000 houses and relying on mortgage credit restriction to depress private house-
building.xxviii Clark concluded: ‘And how right, for every 10,000 houses is £20 million… This 
is the one place in the economy which we can get the elbow room to save us in 1956 and 
1957...’.xxix 
 The Cabinet Secretary stated that the minutes were an accurate reflection of the Prime 
Minister’s statement that, on political grounds, he was unwilling to let total house completions 
fall below 300,000 per year and that local authority completions should not fall below 200,000 
(which he believed to be the highest level achieved under Labour). There was, therefore, no 
question of ‘correcting’ the Cabinet record. However, he added that the issue could be re-
opened in forthcoming Cabinet discussions.xxx Subsequent checking showed that the Prime 
Minister’s figure referred to total house-building, which gave the Treasury ammunition to 
argue for a lower target, in line with Labour’s maximum.xxxi The Treasury argued that:  
The best place for a big disinflationary blow on capital investment is housing… A cut 
in housing investment gives rise immediately to economies in other local authorities’ 
investment – schools, roads, water and sewerage etc… Most of the growth in local 
authorities’ investment in recent years is related to the growth of housing (private 
housing just as much as council housing).xxxii  
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The Treasury also successfully lobbied for the discontinuation of a formal target for 
private sector house building, using the rather disingenuous argument that, ‘The government 
cannot guarantee a total figure. All it can say is that its programme of Council housing is X, 
plus whatever private housing will do.’xxxiii Abolishing any private sector housing target 
enabled them to intensify restrictions on private house building, as the absence of formal targets 
negated the need for Cabinet approval. Yet the Treasury continued to maintain its own 
unpublished target, pressing for a reduction in private housing completions to 100,000 in 
England and Wales (or 125,000 in Great Britain).xxxiv Treasury policy proved effective. As the 
BSA chairman informed the Bank of England in September 1958, while building societies had 
just managed to hold their rates during the 7 per cent Bank rate era (September 1957 to March 
1958), they could have lent twice as much at their mortgage interest rate than they actually 
did.xxxv  
Government also introduced another initiative with potentially more damaging long-
term impacts on house-building – severe restrictions on `overspill’ developments beyond 
urban boundaries. During the 1930s such developments accounted for a considerable 
proportion of new housing, reducing the potential inflationary impacts of the housing boom 
by using cheap and plentiful agricultural land. Despite the introduction of planning legislation 
in the 1940s, only one green belt had been formally proposed before 1952, for London. 
However, the Conservatives markedly tightened controls on green-field housing development 
through three main measures: directions to planning authorities to create provincial green 
belts; Ministerial refusals to approve urban boundary extensions, and an informal suspension 
of the New Towns programme in England and Wales. This policy partly reflected party 
political concerns – to prevent large-scale population movements into constituencies which 
were typically ‘Conservative seats, and usually marginal’.xxxvi However, it was also justified 
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in terms of preventing green field developments that would require roads, sewers, and other 
expensive infrastructural investment. 
Building firms were also targeted by controls on raising capital. For example, by the 
middle of 1955 they were said to experience difficulties even in obtaining marginal or 
temporary finance.xxxvii This was a particular problem for private sector house-builders, which 
were almost entirely small or medium family firms, highly reliant on the banks for working 
capital.xxxviii This was a deliberate Treasury strategy; as a May 1956 note to the Chancellor 
stated, ‘Broadly, control of the money supply should work to prevent industries and people 
from getting the money to build. This assumes that the banks won’t lend the money to builders 
or people wanting to build. In so far as people who want to build have to borrow other than 
from banks, they ought to be caught either by the C.I.C. or by the new issue market, or by the 
refusal of the Central Exchequer to lend.’xxxix 
 The long-term consequences of depressing house-building were rarely discussed. The 
MHLG was ill-equipped to mount an economic defence of house-building; it operated on a 
shoe-string and employed no housing economists until the late 1960s.xl Meanwhile the 
Treasury and Bank of England undertook no significant analysis of the long-term consequences 
of their policy. One rare, brief, Treasury discussion proposed that part of the growth in 
household numbers over the next twenty years might be met by the more economic use of the 
existing housing stock – implying declining living standards in terms of housing space and 
quality.xli 
III 
The Treasury’s success in restricting house-building was largely dependent on the invisible 
nature of indirect mortgage lending controls and the fact that, following the abolition of any 
formal target for private sector housing, it could further squeeze this sector without reference 
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to Cabinet. Housing policy continued to enjoy great political priority, which posed a potential 
threat to Treasury policy, especially given the championing of house-building by Harold 
Macmillan (as Prime Minister). In April 1958 Macmillan warned the Cabinet of the political 
attractions of Labour’s pledge for 100 per cent mortgages and asked for similar proposals.xlii 
This led to a perverse situation where the state was simultaneously spending substantial sums 
on highly-publicised policies to increase demand for private housing and covertly restricting 
the supply of new houses through mortgage rationing.  
 Macmillan’s personal intervention resulted in the 1959 House Purchase and Housing 
Act. Approved building societies were given access to Exchequer loans at 0.5 per cent below 
the current building society mortgage rate, to enable them to provide mortgages for pre-1919 
houses, of a value up to £2,500 (£3,000 in certain London districts) sold for owner-occupation. 
In return, building societies were required to advance up to 95 per cent of the purchase price 
and use the capital freed up by the scheme to provide 95 per cent mortgages for inter-war 
houses in this price band, to borrowers who could provide collateral security (such as an 
insurance policy) to cover the margin between the maximum standard building society loan to 
value ratio for pre-1940 houses (typically 75 per cent) and the new 95 per cent ratio.xliii 
 The Treasury acquiesced as it did not believe the legislation would have any great 
impact. William Armstrong (Third Secretary to the Treasury) was reported to doubt, ‘whether 
this scheme would result in a great deal of business. He calculated that a 95% mortgage on 
£2,500 would require monthly repayments of about £17:10:- which he would have thought, 
generally speaking, to be well above the present controlled rent of such premises. Few sitting 
tenants might therefore feel encouraged to purchase and only a small number of such houses 
are likely to be sold with vacant possession in the open market.’xliv The scheme in fact proved 
very popular and by July 1961 (when it was terminated as part of a new ‘stop’ policy phase), 
£93 million of the £100 million originally committed had been allocated.xlv  
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 These ‘July measures’ also involved tightening restrictions on both private and public 
sector house-building.xlvi This contributed to a growing housing shortage, particularly for new 
houses. In 1963 almost a quarter of British families were living in properties more than 80 
years old and almost half lived in houses built before 1919. As The Economist noted, ‘We are 
living in a remarkable society where the proportion of British households with television sets 
(around 80 per cent) is higher than the proportion with such elementary facilities as hot water, 
a lavatory and a fixed bath’.xlvii The article also noted the damaging impact of high interest 
rates on mortgage lending, though it made no suggestion that restricting house-building was a 
deliberate aim of government policy.xlviii  
Over the first five months of 1962 only 77,000 private houses were started in England 
and Wales, while the ‘stop’ measures were said to have significantly weakened the house-
building sector.xlix With an eye to the next election, government instigated a new house-
building drive and, in May 1963, not only re-affirmed the 300,000 housing target but actually 
raised it, to 350,000 – a figure that was further increased to 400,000 by the election.l This 
involved measures to stimulate housing demand (despite the fact that the Treasury and Bank 
of England persisted in their policy of restricting supply). Owner-occupiers were already 
permitted to avoid tax on that part of their income used for mortgage instalments. From 1963 
they were also freed from paying Schedule A income tax on the stream of services flowing 
from their investment in house property. Largely as a result, tax reliefs rose from £75 million 
in 1962-3 to £180 million by 1967-8 - dwarfing Exchequer subsidies to public sector housing, 
of only £94 million. By 1970/71, when the new Tory government launched its crusade against 
subsidised public housing, tax reliefs to owner-occupiers had reached almost £300 million.li  
Thus government policy acted to greatly increase the financial incentives for home-ownership, 
while simultaneously restricting access – a dangerous cocktail which contributed to the 
property price spike when restrictions were relaxed in the early 1970s. 
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The early 1960s witnessed growing public concern regarding homelessness and the 
activities of predatory and sometimes criminal private landlords (`Rachmanism’). In 1965 there 
was still an absolute housing shortage of around 670,000 dwellings, while over the next ten 
years the number of households was expected to increase by around 150,000 per annum. There 
was also a perceived need to replace many older dwellings (including slum clearance).lii 
Housing was a major, arguably decisive, issue in the 1964 General Election.liii The new Labour 
government pledged to raise house-building to 500,000 a year by 1970.liv Proposed measures 
included a lower interest rate for housing – both for prospective owner-occupiers and social 
housing providers (local authorities and housing associations); 100 per cent local authority 
mortgages; and support for the building societies, if necessary, to prevent heavy withdrawals 
of funds from reducing mortgage lending to below planned levels.lv  
However, expansionary policy was short-lived. Evidence suggests that sterling was 
already over-valued by the beginning of the 1960s and was believed by some authorities to be 
in ‘fundamental disequilibrium’ at the time of Labour’s election victory. The new 
government’s decision not to devalue (on Treasury advice) effectively killed off any real 
prospect of it achieving its housing target.lvi The November 1964 Bank Rate rise and the credit 
squeeze that followed led to a tightening of building society finance, with mortgage interest 
rates rising to 6.75 per cent. They were prevented from rising further by Treasury pressure; the 
Chancellor, James Callaghan, informed the BSA that, ‘Government would view with deep 
concern any move by the building societies to increase the rate of interest payable on 
mortgages.’lvii The Minister of Housing also promised that local authority mortgages would be 
restricted to match building society loan rationing.lviii Meanwhile housing developers faced 
both higher interest rates and requests to the banks to restrict lending on ‘speculative property 
development’ – including house-building.lix  
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By the end of 1967 the Labour government had formally abandoned its 500,000 houses 
target and the following years witnessed a further tightening of policy.lx The building industry 
complained about the increasing difficulty of securing bank loans, especially for private house-
builders.lxi Public sector housing was also increasingly squeezed; in a December 1968 
Commons statement the Prime Minister announced that the current review of public 
expenditure would cover all sectors of the economy, including housing.lxii  
IV 
 In June 1970 a new Conservative government was elected,  with a more free-market 
approach to housing, including extending home-ownership to lower-income groups; 
encouraging the sale of council houses; and a more vigorous private sector building 
programme (with building societies requested to prioritise new over ‘second-hand’ houses for 
mortgages).lxiii This was facilitated by a growing view among Treasury and Bank of England 
officials by the end of the 1960s that the City’s success as an international financial centre 
was not necessarily dependent on the strength of sterling, given developments such as the 
growth of London’s euro-dollar market.lxiv However (in contrast to the 1980s’ housing boom) 
house mortgage lending remained dominated by mutual building societies, who were still 
subject to their traditional prudential lending constraints of being limited by their deposits 
and reserves and – unlike the banks – were unable to create credit.lxv 
The relaxation of mortgage rationing, in the context of broader financial deregulation, 
under the government’s new ‘Competition and Credit Control’ framework, triggered an 
unprecedented surge in building starts. The number of new mortgage loans in the second half 
of 1971 and the first half of 1972 was 44 per cent higher than in the second half of 1969 and 
the first half of 1970, and the boom continued until the second half of 1973.lxvi The volume of 
money flowing into the housing sector overwhelmed the capacity of Britain’s depleted house-
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building industry to extend output and fuelled house-price inflation. To speed up private house-
building, the Minister of Local Government and Development, Graham Page, let it be known 
in April 1972 that planning appeals regarding any areas of the south-east scheduled for growth 
would be looked on favourably by Whitehall. However, The Economist noted that the 
underlying problem driving up building land prices was not land shortages, but the huge 
inflows of money into housing following government measures to ease the money supply. 
Meanwhile institutional investors were also moving their money into land speculation, further 
driving up prices and restricting supply to builders.lxvii 
The ratio of average initial mortgage payments to gross incomes for first-time house-
buyers rose sharply from around 20 per cent during 1970-72 to 24.0 per cent in 1973 and 25.0 
per cent in 1974.lxviii This formed part of a more general inflationary boom that also 
encompassed lending to commercial and residential property developers, often by the less 
regulated ‘secondary banks’.lxix In the second half of 1973 market interest rates rose and 
building societies were unable to respond with sufficient rate increases to maintain deposit 
inflows – partly owing to political pressure not to further raise mortgage rates beyond the 11 
per cent rate introduced in October.lxx 
These problems contributed to a major secondary banking crisis from autumn 1973 to 
early 1975, which risked contagion throughout the financial system – averted via the Bank of 
England ‘lifeboat operation’. This was accompanied by a major stock market slump, sharp rises 
in interest rates, and a collapse in land values. Housebuilders found themselves without 
financial support from their banks, a bleak market for new equity issues, and declining 
valuations for their land banks.lxxi Housing starts during 1974 were half those of the previous 
year and housing completions never fully recovered during the rest of the decade.lxxii 
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Many house-builders were faced with a glut of completed or near-completed larger 
homes, for which demand had melted away.lxxiii A wave of house-builder failures began in 
September 1974, when the mixed construction and housing firm Budge brothers went into 
liquidation. Then Bovis, Britain’s fourth-largest housebuilder, crashed, shaking confidence in 
the sector (despite a rescue by P&O that allowed it to continue trading). During 1975 house-
builder liquidations accelerated, including Northern Developments (Britain’s second largest 
house-builder), while the wave of failures continued through 1976 and into 1977. Other firms 
disappeared through acquisition or made a quiet retreat from the sector. This contrasts sharply 
with the previous history of the speculative housing sector, where the collapse of major firms 
had been rare.lxxiv 
A May 1975 Bank of England analysis noted that building society interest rate 
restriction  had destabilised the housing market, constituting a major factor behind the crash.lxxv 
The Bank of England was exploring ways to achieve house-building ‘stabilisation’.lxxvi 
However, the Bank viewed ‘stabilisation’ primarily from a macroeconomic, rather than a 
housing market, perspective. As a Bank report noted, restricting private sector house-building 
was an effective – if inefficient – macroeconomic lever: ‘housing expenditure is one of the 
areas where monetary policy can have a clear and significant impact.’ lxxvii Yet it also found 
that the decrease in private sector investment in dwellings during 1974, equivalent 0.5 per cent 
of GDP, induced a fall in aggregate demand that could have been achieved by a mere 1.5 per 
cent rise in all direct tax rates.lxxviii 
From 1975 a Joint Advisory Group [JAG], comprised of government and BSA 
representatives, sought to develop a system whereby building society gross mortgage approvals 
would be adjusted to ensure stability: the ‘guideline system’.lxxix During its first years conflicts 
between the building societies’ understanding of the objectives of ‘stabilisation’ – ensuring a 
high and stable flow of mortgage funds to support the housing market without causing 
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significant house-price inflation – did not clash with the Treasury and Bank of England’s wish 
to use the system to support general macroeconomic stabilisation. The housing market 
remained depressed, banks wished to reduce, rather than increase, their commitments to house-
builders, and a hang-over of unsold properties from the last boom prevented significant house 
price inflation. The Secretary of State for the Environment, Anthony Crosland, had sought to 
introduce measures to restore confidence in the housing market. However, he faced Treasury 
opposition, both on cost grounds and potential conflicts with macroeconomic policy 
objectives.lxxx As the Chancellor, Dennis Healey, informed Crosland, ‘it will be necessary to 
pay particular attention to the inevitable limitation on available resources for all forms of 
domestic consumption over the next few years; and I would hope that, for example, we would 
studiously avoid getting publicly committed to a view on the tolerable size of the overall level 
of house building.’lxxxi  
The economic crisis of 1976 further reduced the Labour government’s room for 
manoeuvre in supporting the housing market and added weight to Treasury and Bank of 
England arguments in favour of repressive policy.lxxxii The guideline system does not appear to 
have substantially altered the basic policy of Treasury restraint of private house-building. For 
example, a 1979 Department of the Environment report found that at prevailing interest rates 
building societies had long faced ‘a more or less permanent mortgage queue’.lxxxiii 
V 
A January 1974 Bank of England memorandum argued that house-building finance had 
three components – an essential cycle (present in the absence of official intervention), an 
exaggerated cycle (reflecting stop-go policy), and a structural deficit – caused by mortgage 
lending being constrained by Treasury restrictions to some extent at all points in the cycle.lxxxiv 
A further, May 1975, Bank analysis found that fluctuations in public and private house-building 
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moved pro-cyclically with each other, accentuating the overall impact of housing construction 
volatility.lxxxv This led to considerable wasting of building resources, including labour (which 
was often subject to unemployment, not absorbed elsewhere in the economy); a higher risk 
premium demanded by house-builders and their suppliers, rising house prices; and lower 
productivity and technical progress. 
Moreover, the paper hypothesised that stop-go policy contributed to house price 
inflation (a result consistent with Holmans’ observation that all instances of accelerating house 
prices during the mortgage rationing era were either accompanied with, or preceded by, a rise 
in building society lending).lxxxvi During cyclical upswings house prices tended to rise rapidly, 
while in downswings they rarely fell in money terms. In a market where buyers’ knowledge 
was highly imperfect and supply was geographically fragmented, the new price levels 
established in upswings could be regarded as self-validating by their effect on expectations - 
with housing becoming a hedge against inflation.lxxxvii Subsequent studies have also 
emphasised the key role of inflationary expectations, on the part of house-buyers and/or 
building land owners.lxxxviii 
High house-price inflation during ‘go’ phases of the policy cycle reflected the house-
building sector’s inability to respond rapidly to sudden increases in mortgage lending. With the 
exception of Wimpey, the big construction firms focused on commercial property or public 
sector contracting, regarding speculative house-building as, ‘the bottom end of the market’.lxxxix 
Furthermore, it was problematic for firms in other sectors of construction to rapidly switch into 
house-building during ‘go’ phases of the cycle, owing to their lack of key assets – particularly 
land banks. Michael Ball found that the time taken to switch into housing was longer than the 
amplitude of housing cycles.xc Meanwhile the small and medium firms which accounted for 
most activity in this sector had limited resources and could not afford to carry land banks much 
larger than were required for typical business conditions. Therefore, when restrictions were 
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relaxed, as in the early 1970s, output proved ‘sticky’ and much of the additional mortgage 
funding translated into house price inflation. 
A number of studies have noted asymmetries in the impacts of general stop-go policy 
on the housing market – with credit squeezes having a rapid negative impact, but relaxation 
of restrictions taking much longer to reverse the lost building output.  A 1962 industry report 
noted that stop phases of the cycle forced small building firms out of the market; led to the 
loss of scarce skilled building labour; discouraged building firms and building materials 
suppliers from expanding capacity; and made long-term planning and the use of forward 
planning techniques impractical.xci A 1974 industry-based report emphasised the problems of 
expanding depressed capacity to meet increased demand during ‘go’ phases. The building 
materials sector was unwilling to expand to meet demand peaks, give that much of the new 
capacity would lie idle during the next ‘stop’ phase, while the high weight to value ratio of 
most building materials reduced the scope for imports.xcii Such arguments would also apply to 
key building trades such as bricklayers – who, having been forced to find other work during 
housing slumps, might not return to the sector. Holmans argued that builders’ inability to 
respond to demand peaks in the 1970s is consistent with learning effects from previous cycles 
that upturns would be short-lived – which he views as the main explanation for the house 
price spikes that accompanied the mortgage relaxations of the early and late 1970s.xciii  
Comparisons of Britain’s house-building record over time, and internationally, 
corroborates these findings. Figure 1 compares British post-war and inter-war house-building 
(with starting dates of 1954 and 1924 respectively, to exclude the periods of initial 
adjustment after the two world wars). We show three measures of activity: capital formation 
in dwellings as a proportion of gross domestic fixed capital formation [hereafter GDFCF]; 
and house completions, for private sector, and for all, dwellings, per thousand households. 
Inter-war private sector housing completions are substantially higher than post-war 
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completions, as was the contribution of dwellings to GDFCF. Total housing completions are 
also markedly below the levels of the mid and late 1930s, but the difference is less – perhaps 
reflecting the fact that, unlike private house-building, government restriction of local 
authority housing was not ‘invisible’ to public scrutiny. When deductions from the housing 
stock are added, the difference between the two periods is even greater, as 475,000 houses 
were destroyed by war-time bomb damage and over 1945-68 (almost entirely after 1954) 
some 900,000 `slum dwellings’ were demolished in England and Wales, compared to only 
around 17,000 from 1919-30 and 272,836 from 1930-39.xciv However, the graph does not 
show any huge volatility in the post-war data, with dwellings generally accounting for 
between 16-20 percent of GDFCF after 1955. This is consistent with the evidence of learning 
effects among house-builders, who reacted to frequent restrictions on mortgage finance and 
the availability of capital by maintaining outputs that would not leave them over-stretched 
during down-turns.  
[FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE] 
We also compare Britain’s post-war housing record with nine other West European 
countries, in Table 1. This is based on a United Nations data source, which has the advantage 
of using common statistical definitions and thus avoids problems associated with the treatment 
of the value of land before improvement and alterations to existing buildings. Britain is shown 
to be a negative outlier in terms of its ratio of gross fixed capital formation in dwellings to 
GNP/GDP, with the lowest (for 1955-59, equal lowest) ratio in each of the five sub-periods 
examined. Yet its coefficient of variation for this measure is not exceptional compared to these 
other countries. British ratios were also substantially lower than those for the USA, Canada 
Australia, and New Zealand.xcv 
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On the basis of this evidence of asymmetric impacts of stop and go phases of policy, 
we hypothesise that while a tightening of restrictions on building society mortgage lending will 
produce a fall in housing starts, a relaxation of the same magnitude will produce a substantially 
smaller increase in housing starts, but will boost house-price inflation. The archival and 
quantitative evidence (in Figure 1 and Table 1) also suggests that lending was typically 
restricted, to some extent, across the cycle. 
[TABLE 1 NEAR HERE] 
To interrogate the issue further we compile a set of quarterly time series data covering 
1955 (the first year after the end of building controls) to 1979 (thus excluding the substantive 
shift in both housing and general macroeconomic policy during the Thatcher government). 
Drawing on recent work examining ‘stop-go’ policies in consumer durables, we utilise times 
series methods to examine the impact of policy.xcvi However, we utilise a different modelling 
procedure, employing a three-staged least squares estimator to capture the endogenous 
relationship between housing supply (HS) and house prices (HP).xcvii We therefore jointly 
estimate a system of two equations, but include a series of lags in order to ensure stationarity 
in the data. 
The housing starts equation estimates the determinants of current period housing 
starts, 𝐻𝑆𝑡. Private sector housing starts are modelled as being determined by prior household 
construction (𝐻𝑆𝑡−1 and 𝐻𝑆𝑡−2);  the average price of a housing in the previous period (𝐻𝑃𝑡−1); 
lagged real income (measured by quarterly consumer incomes in current market prices)  
and ; the variable mortgage interest rate (𝑟𝑡); housing costs in downswings and upswings 
in the previous quarter (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡−1), constructed as the weighted average of building 
employment costs (two thirds) and input costs (one third);  and credit rationing, the key variable 
of interest, that is proxied by the ratio of the BSA mortgage interest rate to the  Bank rate, with 
yt-1
yt-2
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a four period lag to capture the build-up of liquidity restraints 𝑀𝐵𝑅𝑡−4. Given the literature 
highlights asymmetry in the impact of the policy in upswings, compared to downswings, we 
split into two variables - for periods where rationing is tightened, or relaxed. We included year 
dummy variables to capture annual trends, quarterly dummy variables to capture seasonal 
effects, political dummies to capture which political party was in power and the error term  
𝐻𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐵𝑅(𝑡𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡−4 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐵𝑅(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡−4 +
𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑔))𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠(𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐻𝑆𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐻𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐻𝑆𝑡−2 + ∑ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡
𝐺
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑄𝑡 +
𝑄
𝑖=1 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑡   (1) 
The second equation captures house prices (𝐻𝑃𝑡) that are driven by the average price 
of a new housing in the previous period (𝐻𝑃𝑡−1), housing completions in the previous period 
(𝐻𝐶𝑡−1), and the variable mortgage interest rate (𝑟𝑡). We have included a set of series relating 
to demographic and economic factors for wages and wage growth, net migration, and the 
unemployment rate. With regard to property taxes and mortgage interest tax relief, we have 
added three new series. The first shows the stamp duty payable on an average new house, based 
on HM Revenue and Customs, Annual Stamp Tax Statistics 2016-17, ASTP-Release-Bulletin-
Sept17.pdf, Table R1. The second is a dummy variable, which we term Tax, to account for the 
abolition of Schedule A taxation on owner-occupied housing from the 1963/64 tax year. A 
dummy variable is appropriate, given that there was no property revaluation under the Schedule 
between the Second World War and its abolition. We have also added a variable to show the 
change in mortgage interest tax relief from the 1974/5 tax year. Previously all mortgage interest 
had qualified for tax relief, while from 1974/5 relief was limited to the interest on £25,000, 
which remained unchanged until this was increased to £30,000 from the 1983/84 tax year.xcviii 
Hence,  
et
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𝐻𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐵𝑅𝑡−4 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐵𝑅𝑡−6 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑡−1  + 𝛽5𝐻𝑆𝑡−1 +𝛽6𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑦𝑡−2 +
𝛽7𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝 𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽7𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓 + ∑ 𝑄𝑡 +
𝑄
𝑖=1 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (2) 
The findings are presented in Table 2. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test suggest that 
stationarity and the model fit is high, in line with previous studies.xcix The central finding, 
reinforcing the archival and descriptive evidence, is that asymmetric impacts occur during the 
‘stop’ and ‘go’ phases of policy influencing housing starts, which then feed into house prices.c 
The positive sign indicates that a tightening of restrictions on building society mortgage lending 
will produce a fall in housing starts, while a relaxation of the same magnitude does not have a 
statistically well-defined impact on housing starts. The findings also suggest that there is 
asymmetry on the cost side, with reductions in costs leading to expansion in housing starts 
during downturns, but these fail to have a well determined impact during upturns, implying 
that capacity constraints were biting. Housing starts are determined in part by their prior 
history, with lagged starts being correlated with current starts, but interestingly house prices 
have do not have discernible effect on starts.ci Higher interest rates reduce construction of new 
private sector houses and public sector housing building is complementary to private sector 
housing. We note that, while we are not able to empirically examine land supply and 
restrictions directly, due to lack of data availability, there are several reasons to consider that 
these issues may not be material. First, our archival evidence shows that it was typically central 
government that pushed for a more restrictive land policy. Furthermore, studies for the more 
recent past have found, `only limited supporting evidence to indicate that weakness in house 
starts since 1997 has been due to planning’ and weak effects for planning policy variables.cii 
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
Policy liberalisation typically mainly raises house prices, while more completions 
dampen prices, implying that policy - by reducing housing starts - fuelled house price inflation. 
However, the findings suggest that the policy impact weakens over time, falling by about 45% 
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between the four and six period lags. Prior prices also have a strong impact. The results are 
consistent with the Bank of England’s finding that housing was perceived as a hedge against 
inflation, expectations of future price growth having a self-fulfilling impact. The income 
elasticity is lower, compared to later periods, but only marginally so.ciii Of the socio-economic 
variables all are significant and intuitively signed with the exception of migration. With regard 
to property taxes and mortgage interest tax relief, of three variables added we find the tax relief 
variable is the only one that is statistically well determined. 
V 
House-building restriction has a number of important implications for debates regarding stop-
go policy, Britain’s housing problem, and the distributional consequences of government 
macroeconomic policy. Mortgage rationing (and to some extent, public sector housing 
restrictions) are almost entirely neglected in the general stop-go literature, despite having been 
regarded as one of the most important policy instruments. This suggests that further research 
may be needed regarding how pervasive stop-go restrictions were in depressing investment in 
other sectors neglected by this literature, such as other infrastructure investment, nationalised 
industries, and education and training. 
Our findings also suggest that the conventional methodology for measuring the impact 
of stop-go – comparing the volatility of output over time, relative to other countries -  is 
inappropriate.civ The Bank of England found that housing restrictions acted to depress output 
at all points of the cycle and that policy had strong asymmetries, with output falling during 
periods of intensified restrictions, but failing to rapidly recover during `go’ phases, a result 
corroborated by our econometric analysis. These arguments may also be relevant to other stop-
go instruments. For example, a recent analysis of the consumer durables sectors found that 
firms came to expect frequent intensification of restrictions and thus adopted strategies to 
mitigate their costs, such as reducing long-term investment and using scale-flexible rather than 
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mass production techniques.cv Again, this is consistent with learning effects regarding the 
transience of any relaxation in restrictions. 
Our findings also have important implications for the long-term development of the 
British housing market. We show that policy restricted private sector house-building, to 
varying extents, over most of the quarter century from 1955. This had a major cumulative 
impact on the housing stock and impeded changes to its geographical mix during a period of 
significant regional shifts in employment, thus reducing the mobility of labour. It also led 
purchasers to view housing as a hedge against inflation and an appreciating long-term asset, 
which fed into a destabilising exaggerated housing cycle. 
Finally, policy had important distributional impacts. Building societies reacted to 
shortages of funds by raising minimum deposit ratios to well above the five percent typically 
required for new houses in the 1930s, while tightening criteria for lenders regarded as good 
risks.cvi This reduced the access of working-class and lower middle class households to the 
mortgage market and, in conjunction with restrictions on public sector house-building, 
markedly slowed the amelioration of homelessness, overcrowding, and poor housing standards. 
Policy also had important inter-generational impacts, reducing the proportion of families with 
house assets to pass on to their children. The case of housing restriction thus reinforces 
evidence that stop-go policy acted to disproportionately place the burden of adjustment to 
macroeconomic policies such as sterling convertibility and financial liberalisation in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and macroeconomic stabilisation in the 1970s, on lower and middle income 
households.cvii 
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Table 1: Gross fixed capital formation in housing as a percentage of GNP/GDP for Britain and nine West European countries, 1954-59 
 
Country Belgium France Italy Netherlands W. Germany Denmark Finland Norway Sweden UK
Average:
1955-59 4.3 4.7 5.9 4.6 5.2 2.8 5.7 4.5 5.2 2.8
1960-64 4.9 5.1 6.7 4.1 5.6 3.6 5.8 4.2 5.4 3.2
1965-69 5.7 6.7 6.5 5.3 5.6 4.6 5.5 4.6 5.7 3.5
1970-74 5.2 7.0 6.3 5.9 6.1 5.6 7.0 5.2 5.4 3.6
1975-79 6.8 7.0 5.6 5.6 5.9 6.0 7.0 5.3 4.4 3.5
Coefficient of variation
1955-62 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.08
1963-70 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.09
1971-79 0.19 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.11  
Sources: United Nations, Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe (New York): 1961, pp. 26-27, 1962, pp. 82-89, and Table 2 in the 1968, 
1970, 1972, 1974, 1977, 1980, and 1982 issues. 
 
Notes: Data for are expressed as a proportion of GNP until 1969 for averages and until 1970 for the coefficient of variation, then as a proportion of GDP 
thereafter, owing to changes in how the figures were reported. Gross fixed capital formation in residential buildings is defined as the value of work on the 
construction of residential buildings, including major alterations in, and additions to, such buildings, but excluding the value of land before improvement. 
Expenditures on the instalment of new permanent fixtures are included. 
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Table 2. Impacts of “Stop-Go” policies on private housing starts and house prices (1955 
Q1 – 1979 Q1) 
 
Sources: Public and private sector housing starts - CSO, Economic Trends Annual Supplement 
(various issues); new house prices mortgaged with building societies at the completion stage – data set 
provided by Geoff Meen, obtained directly from the Department of the Environment, but consistent 
with Housing and Construction Statistics; basic weekly wage in the construction industry and 
Construction Material Cost Index, housebuilding, - data set provided by Geoff Meen, supplied by the 
Department of Employment. Employment was weighted 67% and building inputs 33% as used in 
Meen, `Spatial aggregation.’ We also experimented with using each input separately. However, the 
wage and constructions series are highly correlated (over 0.9) and so entering both separately leads to 
Determinants of private housing starts Co-eff z-stat
Policy instrument log(Mortgage rationing - tightening)-4 0.293 *** (2.68)
log(Mortgage rationing - relaxing)-4 0.158 (1.38)
log(Construction costs - downswing -1) -0.035 ** (2.64)
log(Construction costs - upswing -1) -0.008 (0.66)
Ref. (Conservative Labour (1964-70) -0.087 (1.09)
 1951-64) Conservative (1970-74) 0.031 (0.34)
Labour (1974-79) -0.214 (1.44)
log(House prices) 0.443 *** (5.08)
log(Variable mortgage rate) -0.088 *** (5.03)Lagged housing starts, l Priv te housin  starts-1) .467 .29
Determinants of real private house prices
Policy instrument log(Mortgage rationing)-4 0.106 *** (3.26)
log(Mortgage rationing)-6 0.051 (0.11)
log(Variable mortgage rate) -0.039 *** (3.22)
Stamp Duty -0.002 (0.24)
Abolishing tax 0.036 *** (3.79)
Mortgage relief 0.027 (0.72)
Demographics Proportion of unemployed -0.042 ** (2.28)
and economic variables log(Migration) 1.169 (1.40)
log(Wage) 0.262 *** (3.62)
log(Change wages) 0.028 *** (4.62)
Lagged house prices, log(House prices-1) 0.617 *** (3.26)
and GDP log(House prices-2) -0.431 (1.01)
log(Real Income-1) 1.782 *** (2.68)
log(Real Income-2) 0.029 (0.75)** 2.3
Quarterly dummies YES
Year dummies YES
R
2
 (Housing Starts) 0.82
R
2
 (House prices) 0.88
Prob > F 0.00
Breusch-Godfrey Test (Χ2) 34.14
Augumented Dickey-Fuller Test -4.35
N 89
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high levels of multicollinearity, while using either individually provided analogous outcomes. We are 
grateful to Geoff Meen for supplying hard copy read outs obtained from the Dept. of the Environment 
and the Dept. of Employment. Bank rate, mortgage rate, household consumption, GDFCF, GDP, 
wholesale price index, GDP deflator, Consumer prices index, Bank of England, ‘Three centuries of 
data - version 2.3,’ available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/threecenturies.aspx. 
Notes: 1. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05. 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test estimated incorporates trend and a 
constant.  
Figure 1: Capital formation in dwellings as percentage of total capital formation and housing 
completions per thousand families, private houses and all houses, 1921-38 and 1954-79 
 
Sources: housing completions (1924-48), Scott, Triumph of the South, p. 84; capital formation 
and house completions (1954-1979), CSO, Economic Trends Annual Supplement (London: 
HMSO, 1981), pp. 48 & 59, population estimates, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, International 
Historical Statistics 1750-2010, online (April 2013) version, Table A5, 
http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137305688.0590?focus=true ;  
household size, Peter Scott, ‘The household economy since 1870’, 362-386 in Roderick Floud, 
Jane Humphries, and Paul Johnson, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Vol. 
2 1870 to the Present (Cambridge, 2014), p. 364.  
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Notes: 1924-38 house completions data are for years ending 31st March of the following year. 
Household sizes are for England and Wales up to 1971 and England for 1981, for Census years 
plus 1939, with interpolation for intervening years.  
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